prerequisites for democratization, like the growth of an independent civil society or means of political dissent, were nourished in the wake of Western impact. 2 But neither Lee Kwan Yew, nor well-intentioned Western political theorists, nor area studies scholars trained in Western social science, even begin to exhaust the discourse on democracy in China. The books under review here give English-language readers a small taste of the vast literature speaking to and working within the contemporary continuation (some would say "revival") of Confucianism in Chinese-speaking academic communities since at least the 1970s. Contra Lee's insistence that Chinese political culture is necessarily and naturally authoritarian, this literature takes as its very starting point the assimilation of Western theories of science and democracy into indigenous Chinese political traditions. These books and the Chinese intellectual trends they discuss stand as powerful reminders that Confucianism and its traditions did not end when the Communists declared victory in 1949, only to re-emerge again in the 1990s as atavistic responses to the excesses of "Western" economic and political development. The movement dubbed "New Confucianism" (in Chinese, dangdai xin Rujia or xiandai xin Ruxue, among other various terms) offers an especially influential modern conceptualization of a democratic Confucianism that derives inspiration as much from Immanuel Kant and Henri
Bergson as it does from Mencius and Wang Yangming.
What is so interesting about this movement, however, as well as the ongoing Chinese engagement with Confucian humanism in which it is embedded, is that its potential scope far exceeds the ambition many of its Western interpreters ascribe to it. The concern of many Chinese intellectuals, as both Thomas Metzger and John Makeham point out in their respective volumes, lies not simply in revitalizing China and its diaspora. The "Declaration on Behalf of Chinese Culture" made by Mou Zongsan, Xu Fuguan, and others in 1958 -long understood to be a watershed event in the history of the New Confucian movement -was "respectfully announced to the people of the world," (jinggao shijie renshi xuanyan) not simply to other concerned Chinese. 3 The goal for many contemporary Chinese intellectuals continues to be formulating a political theory for all of us, a theory that through felicitous synthesis overcomes the deficiencies in both Chinese and Western thought to bring into being a compelling and persuasive vision for our future together.
In reviewing these recent books that engage Chinese political thought, I attempt to foreground the implications for Western political theorists of this broad potential applicationsomething these books gesture toward but do not always pursue. The vitality of Confucianism in
Chinese communities, not only in the form of mores but also of a thought-system capable of articulating compelling alternatives to Western ideology, suggests that its substance be taken seriously by more people than those who reside in such communities. What would it mean to treat the modern Chinese political thought presented in these books as compelling political theories, rather than as a tradition that, while not dead, depends for its vitality on injections from yet at others, specifically in his analyses of each thinker, he seems to assert (rather convincingly, in my view) that his trans-cultural perspective yields him a privileged vantage point from which to map out, and transcend, the "see-saw effect" induced by both discourses. Regardless, his book provides hugely important insight into the nature of East-West relations by destabilizing the "canons of rationality" grounding the epistemological assumptions common to each, At 800 pages, many parts of Metzger's book are redundant, and he often repeats the identical sentence in various places throughout. His 100+ page introductory essay could have eliminated much of the redundancy but instead contributed to it. Judicious editing, less copious and more relevant footnotes, 11 and more tightly argued points would easily have halved the size of the book, making it much more accessible to the political theory readership to whom his title seems to appeal. So too would have been a more thorough engagement with contemporary political theory literature itself. Indeed, the reader is often left wondering why Metzger calls the social, ethical and empirical conclusions he draws from the two discourses "political" at all. If his point is to enlarge and expand the field within which we as a global society think about the political, he fails to articulate this explicitly as his goal, and so misses an important opportunity to use his Chinese sources in the service of such an ambitious undertaking. Though Metzger persists in calling his ideas "political theories," his sources are drawn primarily from "classics" in fields like sociology and history (e.g., the work of Talcott Parsons and Max Weber) rather than contemporary work in philosophy or political theory that could add rigor to his methodology. For example, one of his main arguments for his "discourse"-based typology is the "semantic and epistemological category" of the "we-group," which to Metzger is the form through which indisputable, "platitudinous" claims are articulated and commonly accepted "rules for successful thinking" carried out (p. 75-6, 531 et passim). However, he ignores extensive literature in political theory, much of it informed by post-structuralism, highlighting the ways in which such "we-groups" impose a hegemonic and for that reason not necessarily representative identity on the people they include. Such work could, however, reinforce his point that the assumptions invoked by this "we" do express a powerful cultural force that definitively shapes approaches to commonly shared problems.
These considerations make clear that one can broadly endorse as accurate the two "discourses" and their epistemological assumptions Metzger presents, without for that reason condemning East and West to two perpetually disparate "we-groups". This is commonplace; Jiang's historical narrative also brings to light an unusual difference between traditional and modern Confucianism that has gone unremarked in the other three books. He correctly identifies both eras as "dominated" by Confucianism, but in the traditional era this domination carried with it a strong dose of authoritarianism. It was only in the modern, post-dynastic era that Confucianism became unmoored from its authoritarian political framework and began to "dominate" purely in terms of intellectual influence. Yet surely this too has a consequence: the cultural, politically backed influence that permeated Korea, Japan, and Singapore differs remarkably in substance and depth from the merely intellectual influence that reached Europe and America. The richness and breadth of the understanding that resulted was similarly attenuated, a fact which goes far toward explaining a certain orientation toward their subject matter displayed by the English-language books under review here that is not shared by Jiang's book.
In Korea and Japan, Jiang notes, engagements with Confucianism as a tradition took the form of transmission (chuancheng); in Europe and America, research (yanjiu) and explication (chanshu). Jiang fails to comment on the difference, counting both forms of engagement as "influences." For much of East Asia, however, Confucianism constituted the theoretical and cultural matrix by means of which problems were articulated. In the West it served rather as a target of critique for missionaries, an object of study for sinologists, and at best a distant exemplar of rationalized, godless government for men like Voltaire (e.g., 232, 261, 271 or undertake the quandaries of her traditions, surely we can recognize that such is not the case for well-informed and sympathetic individuals. Individual perspectives on political life are not dictated by culture, however much they may be mutually implicated in it. Li Qiang's liberalism, as reviewed by Metzger in chapter five of his book, seems to demonstrate just such a point: it does not seem odd to us as Westerners to see a non-Westerner advocate liberalism or socialism, but we would be quite taken aback were a Westerner to identify him or herself as Confucian.
Metzger's book, which nowhere means to completely transcend a Western frame, actually offers a map of how just such a breach could be effected. The evolution of Metzger's own perspective (shall we call it Discourse #1.5?) that unfolds throughout the book effectively elaborates his own "rules for successful thinking," a process especially clear in his discussion of John Dunn's political philosophy. Despite Metzger's claims to the contrary, his own fascinating approach does not make for an easy fit within either Western or Chinese philosophy, however much it is ambitiously informed by both. This suggests that the kind of cultural knowledge displayed by Western researchers like Makeham and Metzger -neither of whom are political theorists -can be used not only to respond to the problem of "Confucianism and democracy," but to further interrogate it. So too can the work of the thinkers they document: the aggressive and informed syncretism of philosophers like Mou Zongsan, Li Zehou and Tang Junyi further challenges practitioners of Western thought to justify their own parochialism, not in spite of but because of the fact that these Chinese thinkers use Western thought so brilliantly to uncover hidden intimations within their own traditions. However much the work of these thinkers is selfconsciously identified with the "Chinese culture" (Zhongguo wenhua) they believe is both the origin and sustenance of Confucianism, the effectiveness of their political theory does not terminate at the borders of China or its diasporic communities. If Western political theory is to meet the challenge of Chinese political thought, it must begin by considering seriously the stakes involved in their claims.
